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Civic Culture: Public Opinion and the Resurgence of Civic Culture 
Yuri Levada 
 
There has hardly been a stretch in Russian history more saturated with 
sweeping changes than the period between 1988-1993. Packed into this 
exceedingly brief historical era are the rise of "perestroika" and the fall of 
its illustrious leader, Mikhail Gorbachev; the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the emergence in its place of 15 independent states; the August '91 
communist putsch and the democrats' triumphant ascension to power; the 
proliferation of virulent ethnic conflicts and the recognition of the abiding 
need for cooperation; the bloody October '93 confrontation between the 
executive and legislative powers and the surprising strength that the 
nationalist and communist forces showed in the first multi-party 
Parliamentary elections in post-communist Russia . As people watched 
their political elites reshuffled and familiar institutions crumble, they could 
not help feeling alternatively elated, confused, and disillusioned. No 
sooner hopes for a democratic renewal were raised than they were dashed 
by the unexpected hardships which made some feel nostalgic for the lost 
security of the communist system. 
As we try to take stock of these changes and assess their impact on 
Russian political culture, we should realize that the institutional 
transformations tell us only half the story. Hidden behind the visible 
structural dislocations are less apparent and often confusing trends in 
public consciousness. To appraise the state of public mind in today's 
Russia , we need to draw on public opinion surveys. In particular, we shall 
draw on the data collected by the National Center for Public Opinion 
Research that has been tracking political developments in the former 
Soviet Union since the early years of perestroika. [1] 
Among the changes that have shaken Soviet society in the last few years, 
none is more important than the breakdown of the communist party's 
monopoly on power. The one-party state might be history now, but the 
political tradition in which it was rooted is not. This tradition predates the 
Soviet Union and extends much further into Russian history. Thus, today's 
reformers have to grapple not only with the totalitarian institutions built in 
the communist era, but also with the authoritarian practices that have 
existed in Russia for centuries. Far from being destroyed, the old 
totalitarian structures and authoritarian mentalities have demonstrated a 
remarkable capacity for social mimicry and adaptability. Undemocratic 
political sensibilities are manifest in the institutions of mass 
communications, while old stereotypes continue to dominate public 
opinion. Reasons for the persistence of the old attitudes should be sought 
in the Russian political tradition, in the nation's civic culture that was 
retained and amplified by the Soviet regime. Authoritarianism sustained 
by both violence and pervasive paternalism, nearly universal disregard for 
legal norms and procedures, intolerance toward dissent -- these are 
among the most salient features of Russian civic culture. On the one hand, 
this culture breeds widespread fear, obedience, and sycophancy, but on 
the other, it encourages rebellion and contempt for any authorities and 
law among the Russians. We must bear in mind this political heritage 
when we contemplate the most recent upheavals in Russian history. At 
the same time, we should not gloss over real, if contradictory and painful, 
changes that Russian civic culture has undergone in recent years. 
"Political participation," "political support," "public trust" -- these worn-out 
cliches have acquired a decidedly new meaning since democratic reforms 
began to transform Russia. Just a few years ago, "participation" and 
"support" were arbitrarily invoked by the Communist party whenever it 
wished to turn on the mechanisms of "double-think" and "unanimity." Now 
people in Russia have an opportunity to stake out their own political 
position and develop a conscious attitude toward politicians, parties, and 
social events, including the option of withdrawing their trust altogether. 
The traditional preference for unanimity remains strong and the choices 
practically available to the individual are quite limited, but the very fact 
that there is a choice in political matters is undeniable. 
We can isolate three stages in the nation's political development since 
1985. The first stage coincides with Gorbachev's perestroika and is 
distinguished by the half-hearted efforts to reform the Soviet system from 
above and from within by using the leverages provided by the system 
itself. Systematic opinion surveys that began in earnest at this period 
point to the growing prestige of Gorbachev and his politics, the expansion 
of glasnost in the public domain, and the rising hopes (especially among 
the intelligentsia) for liberal reform. The key question that roused the 
public at this point was: "Who is to blame?" That is the question familiar 
to several generations of Russian reformist intellectuals who have 
searched for ways to apportion blame for the nation's sorry state. The list 
of suspects submitted in the late 80s included communist political leaders 
charged with distorting the "true" socialist model. All critics -- from the 
top party brass to extreme Russian nationalists to liberal dissidents -- 
singled out Stalin as the major culprit. This was a neat way to exonerate 
oneself from responsibility and to spare the system's fundamental political 
institutions from serious criticism. 
Research findings from this period support this view. In 1988, 13% 
percent of Soviet citizens named Stalin and his legacy as the main cause 
of the country's problems. This figure grew to 35% in 1989. Similarly, 
Gorbachev's popularity among his countrymen peaked in 1988 at 51%, 
and the interest and trust in the mass media crested in 1989. After that, 
perestroika ran out of steam, the Soviet leader's popularity plummeted, 
and radical reform ideas gained in prominence. 
The second stage in Russia 's political transformation raised another 
question: "Who is to be trusted?" Since 1990, Boris Yeltsin took the center 
stage as the new man of the year -- first, as the proponent of a more 
radical approach to perestroika and later, as a radical democratic 
reformer. The political forces shaping public opinion underwent significant 
transformation in this period. The reform alliance that gave perestroika its 
initial thrust and helped to legitimize it faded from the public scene. The 
public lost interest in the critical press and its endless exposes of past 
abuses. Faced with rising tide of militant nationalism, the looming 
prospects of authoritarianism, and the imminent breakdown of the Soviet 
Union , reform intellectuals retreated in disarray. The high point of this 
second stage was the August '91 putsch, when communist party 
apparatchiks made a desperate attempt to reclaim power, followed by a 
radical counter-putsch engineered by Yeltsin and his democratic 
supporters. The Soviet period in the Russian history officially ended here, 
but some of its key institutions and mentalities have persisted. Our polls 
show that Yeltsin's popularity peaked in July 1990, when he was elected 
to chair the Russian Parliament. This finding suggests that Yeltsin 
appealed to the people first and foremost as a radical opposition leader. 
As the public began to lose its interest in political debunking and in stories 
about the Stalinist excesses, the new stage of Russia 's political 
transformation commenced. This third stage, which dated back to the 
early 1992, placed on the agenda another question well known to the 
Russian reform-minded intellectuals: "What is to be done?" The answer 
was sought not so much in digging out new enemies and plotting new 
revolutions as in freeing prices from state control, encouraging private 
enterprise, and granting more autonomy to regional authorities. The 
liberal policies pursued at this stage tended to be idealistic, impractical, 
and sometimes downright irrational. Liberalism and state reforms clearly 
parted company. Meanwhile, the populace shunned ideology and gave the 
sacramental formula "What is to be done" a pragmatic reading, doing 
what it could to muddle through everyday life. 
Such a turn of events was particularly painful for an authoritarian society. 
Ever since Russia embarked on the course of modernization some 150 
years ago, it relied exclusively on authoritarian means to move the 
country forward. Perestroika and post-perestroika reformers acted in the 
same tradition, seeking to impose reforms from above. By the end of 
1992, support for political institutions and leaders hit a new low. Spurred 
by the ex-liberal scandal-mongering oppositional press, public 
consciousness turned against all politicians and reforms. Perestroika 
intellectuals grew increasingly angry, aggressive, and divisive. No national 
leader or political group seemed capable of commanding authority and 
providing moral guidance. But then again, the state resources for 
ramming social reforms down society's throat were exhausted -- the fact 
that political leaders had a hard time to digest. 
This is not to say that the people deserted their reform leaders altogether. 
They still could lend their support to Yeltsin at a critical juncture, as they 
did during the April '93 national referendum and once again -- for a short 
period only -- during the October 93 showdown between the President and 
the Parliament. But their skepticism about Yeltsin's program remained 
palpable, as they resented the high inflation and unemployment fostered 
by reform policies. Public consciousness became thoroughly deideologized, 
and the absence of credible political programs or leaders did not seem to 
alarm Russian citizens. 
As most societies trying to shake their totalitarian legacy, today's Russia is 
propelled forward not by a coherent reform program but by the confluence 
of events, circumstances, and unexpected crises necessitating ad hoc 
solutions and improvisations. Throughout this seemingly haphazard 
development, however, one can detect a trend toward the 
structuralization of society -- a trend especially important in a country that 
suppressed independent interest groups in the past. In the political 
sphere, new parties began to emerge, which formed the nucleus of the 
future pluralistic politics. Economic interest groups grew conscious of their 
particular agenda and sought to consolidate their influence through 
various organizational outlets. In the area of norms and values, society 
emancipated itself from the patronage of the state which used to mandate 
values for its citizens. [2] Universal human values and negotiated norms 
of everyday life emerged as alternative sources of legitimation in society. 
Opinion surveys from this period give further substance to this 
generalization. Let us take a closer look at the process of political 
differentiation as captured in our findings. 
The National Center for Public Opinion Research has tracked public 
attitudes toward political life in Russia for several years, and as Table 1 
shows (see appendix), the participatory spirit essential to democracy has 
been slow to emerge. 
As you can see, there is a marked drop in the number of "veterans" as 
well as "newcomers" to politics. The percentage of those who is 
disappointed with or lost interest in politics is increasing. At the same 
time, there are fewer individuals who find the political process closed to 
them. It is not so much the inaccessibility of politics that presents a 
challenge to Russian democracy as the lack of sustained interest in 
political matters. Further details could be gleaned from the age 
distribution of the respondents. At the early stages of political reforms in 
Russia , those reporting a high level of political participation were 
primarily individuals aged 40-50. Toward the end of the period in 
question, politically active individuals were primarily those 55 years and 
older. That is to say, respondents reporting high political participation 
tended to be older. By contrast, individuals who lost their interest in or 
were disappointed with politics were often young, followed by the middle-
aged group. Those who felt that they exerted no influence on politics were 
also likely to be young and, toward the end of the period, middle-aged. 
A few words on such terms as "politics," "public life," "political 
participation," as well as "the fate of your nation" are in order here. The 
meaning of these terms underwent considerable changes between 1988 
and 1992. During the Soviet era, "politics" meant something official and 
imposed from above on a common citizen. It included obligatory meetings 
and officially sanctioned demonstrations declaring unanimous support for 
the government, plus the Young Communist League's pseudo-popular 
initiatives. In the early glasnost era that fell between 1987 and 1988, 
public consciousness was agitated and politicized. This was especially 
apparent among the young people and the so-called "60's generation" -- 
dissident intellectuals whose formative years coincided with the 
Khrushchev thaw. Political clubs and seminars sprang up throughout the 
country, with the participants making daring (by the standards of the 
time) speeches and proposing novel political schemes. The circle of people 
united into these groups was fairly narrow, but their influence was 
growing rapidly, spurred in part by the liberal press. This liberal "club 
culture" operated with the approval of Communist party reformers, who 
tried to stir the debates towards "constructive channels" and keep reforms 
within the basic framework of the Soviet system of government. Later on, 
mass political movements would begin to gather force, bringing in their 
wake semi-open elections and ethnic conflicts. The political process could 
no longer be controlled from one center, yet it did not acquire stable 
features of a multi-party system. With the Communist party exiting center 
stage after August '91, the political vacuum ensued, and it has not been 
filled since. After all, the CPSU was not a political but a state monopoly 
structure; the absence of viable political institutions and organizations 
simply became more apparent since the Communist party's sudden 
collapse. 
Totalitarian societies tend to confer the "political" status on each and 
every problem facing the nation, yet they remain profoundly apolitical -- 
not just because the masses of people are politically disenfranchised, but 
because no real political interests are allowed to crystallize and acquire a 
stable organizational form. Where everything is declared to be political, 
especially every initiative undertaken by the extant powers, nothing 
qualifies as a genuinely political event. Politics, state, constitution, election 
-- all these phenomena are robbed of their political content, while public 
and private life, as well as ideology and economics, are radically conflated. 
To be sure, a purely totalitarian society has hardly ever existed. Any 
concrete historical polity has to compromise its principles for the sake of 
efficiency, and Soviet society was no exception to this rule. The so called 
"stagnation period" in Soviet history was filled with such compromises and 
inconsistencies. It can be seen as the practical limit of adaptability that a 
totalitarian society could reach in its efforts to appear normal and civilized 
(hence the ironic label: "Stalinism with the human face"). The dissolution 
of totalitarian structures spurs the differentiation of public and private 
spheres, of political, economic, social, cultural and other institutions which 
hitherto merged into each other. Judge from the available data, this 
process of differentiation is now under way, albeit it moves sluggishly, and 
it is marred with many contradictions. 
Perestroika stimulated the politization of Russian society but it failed to 
create a viable political structure. We can see this era as the period of 
primary politization or political agitation. (I deliberately avoid talking 
about "awakening" or "renaissance," because these terms imply that some 
dormant political structures were waiting to be reignited -- a wrong 
assumption in the case of post-Soviet society). During this stage, the 
party-state apparatus continued to hold the monopoly on power and to 
impede the formation of independent political parties and groups. The 
pyramid of power had the Communist party at the top and no free 
elections were possible. 
The first sign of change was the shift in public attitudes toward the 
traditional power structures, which was accompanied by the weakening of 
the totalitarian monolith. Soviet citizens might have laughed at their 
leaders in the privacy of their homes but they obeyed the authorities in 
public. In the post-Soviet era, the powers no longer had to be taken 
seriously, and as more and more people effectively ignored the 
government orders, the power had lost its effectiveness. The attitude 
toward politics was now comprised of two elements: passive identification 
with certain leaders (which did not differ much from the old Soviet 
attitude) and political agitation (or mobilization) whipped up by 
perestroika reforms. Both elements were doomed to disappear once real 
political structures began to take shape. The mass politization inevitably 
led to the disappointment in the quasi-politics that marked the transitional 
period between totalitarianism and democracy. All changes that 
perestroika brought about in the political domain -- elections, parties, 
demonstrations -- bore the mark of their origins and remained essentially 
quasi-political and unstable. Sooner or later, the primary politization of 
society would have to give way to the formation of a civic culture and 
genuine political structures that reflect diverse political interests and make 
multi-party, pluralistic polity possible. There were signs that such 
structures began to form after 1989, but these were very early and 
distressingly weak portends. 
If stable and working political structures are so hard to come by in today's 
Russian politics, it is because the political interests that these structures 
are supposed to represent are still largely nascent and inchoate. Nor is 
there a viable political milieu -- the middle class -- where such interests 
would have a chance to crystalize. Not only coherent political platforms 
are missing from the Russia 's political scene; political slogans, concepts, 
ideas around which stable political groupings could form remain barely 
audible. There is no dearth of new political headings and noisy statements 
but what exactly they stand for in terms of specific policies is very hard to 
fathom. When a political party or group declared itself in the old 
Parliament, it was usually a byproduct of the latest schism in the 
parliamentary politics and not an indication that the party expressed the 
interests of a certain constituency and intended to press for an electoral 
victory. 
Current public opinion surveys show that the political divisions do not so 
much reflect the political differentiation in the country as they reveal the 
latest swing in the popularity of a particular leader or group. As long as 
society remains organized around the structures of power -- popular or 
not -- it will not know genuine pluralism and political consolidation. 
The current difficulties with building a viable political culture in Russia 
have one unsettling consequence: the disenchantment with democracy 
and the paucity of legitimate political structures. The bridge that was 
supposed to link the old and the new Russia has gone only half way, never 
reaching the other side. The politics in the transitional period breeds 
discontent, provokes frequent crises, and obscures the criteria by which 
one could judge the progress toward democracy. Especially distraught and 
disappointed are those circles which succumbed to initial euphoria and 
developed unrealistic hopes for the imminent reforms. I am talking about 
the country's reform-minded political elites and liberal post-dissident 
intellectuals, including the emigre circles, which exerted a certain 
influence on the politics in the transitional period. If you look at rank and 
file individuals, those normally reached by pollsters, you find a far greater 
stability in mood over the period under study. One could even speak about 
certain socio-psychological types of responses to political turmoil, which 
seem quite independent from the nature of events. Instructive in this 
respect are the answers to the following survey question: "Which mood 
has been most common last year among the people you know?" (see table 
2 in appendix). 
Why did the leaders who came into prominence on the wave of 
perestroika fail to hold on to power? Quite apart from their personal 
dispositions, they were selected for the deconstructive role. They helped 
tear down the old political institutions, but they proved inept when it came 
to the constructive task of building up new political structures. This 
deconstructive thrust of the early perestroika reformers reflected the gap 
between the "can-do" self-image they communicated to their followers 
and their far more limited practical skills and personal abilities. These 
leaders were sold on the idea that Soviet socialism could be rejuvenated, 
that they were the movers and shakers behind the reforms, that they 
could cleanse the "true Leninism" from the Stalinist distortions and return 
the country to the pristine sources of communist ideology. All innovations 
that sprang to life during the Gorbachev era -- the opening up of the mass 
media, elections featuring alternative candidates, campaigns against 
corruption and bureaucratic excesses -- were animated by the idea of 
reclaiming the revolutionary past, with the party apparatus posing as the 
prime engine for this renewal. The 1989-90 national election campaign 
was dominated by the leaders who were brought to power with the 
Communist party's tacit or open approval and who were looking to the 
past rather than to the future for their programmatic statements. When 
the totalitarian structures crumbled, however, they were entirely 
unprepared to offer constructive policies and assume the mantle of 
leadership. Not even dissident intellectuals, with a few notable exceptions, 
were free from the liberal Soviet mentality of renewal and restoration. All 
reforms were to be imposed from above by the wise leaders drawn from 
the educated strata of intellectuals. 
Meanwhile, the foundations of Soviet socialism and the international 
empire it fostered collapsed much faster than anybody thought possible. 
And as soon as it became clear that the hopes for a smooth transition to 
freedom and prosperity were widely exaggerated, the old style leaders 
and their institutions came under attack. Very quickly, they turned from 
facilitators into a stumbling block impeding reforms. The reformist 
alliance, which included party reformers, liberal democratic intelligentsia, 
and nationalistic forces, came apart. Each group formed its own power 
centers, however poorly organized, and each was distinguished by 
vociferous attacks on the state and the executive power. The key divide 
between the political forces at the time was the line between the radical 
pragmatic reformers who gathered around the executive power and 
various oppositional currents. Among the most salient manifestations of 
this division was the confrontation between the presidential and 
parliamentary branches of power that came to a head in 1993. 
Those leaders who failed to transcend their perestroika-from-above 
illusions disappeared from the political scene. Such was the fate of party 
reformers and intellectuals gathered around Gorbachev. Others joined 
newly founded factions and groups. Gorbachev's demise could be 
attributed to the rise of Yeltsin who presented himself to the nation as a 
more radical reformer. But the drop in popularity that Yeltsin's 
government suffered in 1993 suggested that the country was ready for a 
new form of leadership and political organization. 
The Soviet Union has always been a "mobilized society," i.e., society 
based on political activism organized from above and controlled by the 
hierarchy of state power. The political regimes that governed Russia 
throughout much of its history relied on force, propaganda, and 
centralized control to keep the country moving. Unorganized and 
undifferentiated masses of people were to be brought into action and 
compelled toward the goal set forth by the higher authorities. Intellectual 
and moral resources were mobilized in the same way as any other, with 
the intelligentsia enlisted to do the powers' bidding. Mobilization is the 
only form in which a totalitarian society could exists. By contrast, civil 
society is possible only where interest groups and autonomous civic 
structures are allowed to flourish, where individual interests have a 
chance to be articulated and communicated to others. To be sure, 
mobilized and civil societies are but ideal types that approximate reality in 
all its richness and possibilities. Yet, these are useful models that help us 
understand the nature of political processes in the transitional period. 
Both the theory and practice of mobilized society implied that the political 
masses are passive and pliable, that the power mechanisms must be 
turned on to push them in the right direction. Characteristically, 
Bolsheviks favored such terms as "levers," "transmitting belts," "cogs," 
etc., which underscored their philosophical commitment to the 
mobilizational ethics of government. Despotism and coercion endemic to 
the Russian political tradition might account for the ruthlessness with 
which the Bolsheviks set out to realize their mechanical model of 
mobilizational politics. This model had three principal components: 
omnipotent power, subservient people, and since the middle of the 19th 
century, intelligentsia. In recent years, the role of direct coercion and 
fear-fostering propaganda has diminished. The "transmitting belts," to use 
Lenin's favorite expression, have been loosened up. But the Russian polity 
has not shaken fully the mobilizational structures and certainly not the old 
mobilizational mentality. This is evident in the fact that agitation and 
apathy -- the two states most common in a mobilizational society -- are 
characteristic of post-Soviet society, where emotional excitement and 
moral tension are typically followed by periods of depression and asthenic 
apathy. 
The mobilizational thrust of recent Russian reforms was apparent in the 
Gorbachev era, and it was especially evident in the propaganda 
technology used by the elites. The mobilizational mechanisms weakened 
afterwards, but they were still working during the August '91 putsch and 
the April 1993 national referendum. In both cases society was mobilized in 
the face of attempts to restore the old regime, even though most people 
lost their early enthusiasm about reforms. Still, this was mobilizational 
activism and not the kind of steady participatory practice that undergirds 
democratic politics. Except for the nationalistic and ethnic movements that 
unite the constituency around the idea of the opposition to the center and 
local sovereignty, alternative forms of political participation remain in the 
rudimentary stage. The path from a mobilizational political culture to a 
participatory civil society is yet to be charted in the post-Soviet era. 
Now, if we take a closer look at the Russian political elites, we can see 
that their evolution mirrors the problems facing the society that seeks to 
shed the old and build a new civic culture. Soviet society had two kinds of 
elites: power elite and cultural elite (the intelligentsia). Both suffered a 
serious setback in the current political crisis. Following the tradition of 
Russian intelligentsia, Soviet intellectuals sought to modernize the state 
and its citizens. They provided intellectual and moral legitimation to the 
powers and at the same time served, though to a lesser degree, as the 
critics of the system. The Soviet intelligentsia owed to the state its 
ideological, political, and economic autonomy, which is why it aimed 
primarily at the liberal rationalization of the regime. Perestroika spurred 
the intelligentsia's illusions that a wise reformer, drawing expert advice, 
could revamp Russian society. Glasnost encouraged intellectuals to believe 
that they would be the experts called upon to provide the high-brow 
theoretical rationale for the reforms. Yet, intellectuals hardly qualified for 
this role, since few of them possessed expert knowledge adequate to the 
task at hand. That is not to gainsay the key, indeed crucial, role that the 
intelligentsia played in stirring public opinion and mobilizing society in the 
early perestroika years. But this was the intelligentsia's swan song. The 
crisis of perestroika in 1990-91 lead to the disillusionment among 
intellectuals who, along with other national elites, were given to profound 
pessimism about the country's future. The very triangular structure of 
power that carried the Russian polity through more than a century -- 
power-people-intelligentsia -- has collapsed. 
Highly instructive in this respect is the fate of glasnost. Perestroika's 
major and most enduring accomplishment, glasnost lost its luster in the 
post-perestroika period. The freedom of speech, publications, and 
gathering is still in place, but its role as a central factor in public life is 
diminishing. The uncensored word lost its capacity to rouse imagination, 
spur the public into action. The public takes glasnost for granted, if not 
views it with suspicion. This is probably how it should be in a normal 
democratic society, where glasnost serves its informational, aesthetic, and 
other functions. But Russian society today is hardly a functional 
democracy, and the indifference to free speech is a symptom of the 
underlying crisis. 
As the democratic process continues, the Russian intelligentsia is likely to 
lose its traditional mobilizing role and turn into an educated cultural and 
technical elite. Intellectuals are bound to become specialists, that is, if 
Russian society evolves into a participatory democracy. If it follows a 
different type of development, the intelligentsia will continue to vacillate 
between despair and patriotic messianism. In any event, there is no 
return to the traditional triangular power structure. 
For the first time in Soviet history, perestroika transformed Russian 
politicians from larger than life figures exemplifying a particular cause into 
a flesh and blood individuals with some clearly visible strengths and all too 
apparent weaknesses. Gorbachev, Ligachev, Sakharov, Yeltsin (and I 
should add, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and some other western 
politicians) -- these were concrete individuals who could not hide 
themselves behind the carefully polished images, who thrust themselves 
into the public eye by virtue of their willingness to take a stance, to 
venture a personal and sometimes unpopular opinion. The negative side of 
this development was the personalization of politics. The political divisions 
were defined as personal confrontations between Gorbachev and Ligachev, 
Sakharov and Gorbachev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and so forth. However, 
in the post-perestroika years, all politicians suffered in public opinion, 
their popularity taking a dramatic plunge. Here are the ratings that the 
two most prominent Russian politicians were given in a series of polls 
identifying man of the year (see table 3 in the appendix). 
The 1992 figures show that barely one sixth of all those polled gave their 
vote to the man of the year. Three times as many votes went to Yeltsin 
during the April 1993 referendum, but this figure reflected the 
mobilizational agitation that preceded this referendum. Once the political 
strain subsided, the leaders lost their appeal in the pubic eye. Now we 
have clear signs that the politics is getting more and more depersonalized, 
that leadership structure and legitimation patterns are undergoing 
systemic change. 
Soviet society produced not so much political leaders as party bosses 
whose legitimacy derived from their allegiance to the party cause and 
personal connections to the higher layers of power. The popular image 
was important to the party bosses, who cultivated it assiduously through 
propaganda and mass media (Stalin's cult of personality is most revealing 
in this respect). But their "personal charisma" did not precede their ascent 
to power; rather, it devolved on them after they entrenched themselves in 
the power structure. 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin are the last two Soviet-style leaders in 
contemporary Russian politics, though their ascent to power followed 
different paths. Gorbachev received his leadership mantle from the 
Communist party. He tried to legitimize his power as the president elected 
by the Parliament, but his efforts proved a failure. Yeltsin came to national 
prominence as a party maverick and an opposition leader. Later on, he 
was chosen by popular vote as the president of the Russian Federation . 
He assumed real power after the August '91 putsch and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union . Along with the mantle of leadership, he inherited the 
"secondary charisma" that belonged to and protected anyone who 
controlled the state machinery. In 1993, with the state machinery 
sputtering, Yeltsin's popularity ratings began to slide. 
The crisis of power that unfolded in late 1993 dramatized the crisis of the 
old political culture and all its peculiar modes of legitimation, support 
mobilization, and political leadership. To grasp the meaning of the bloody 
confrontation between the President and the Parliament we need to go 
back to the earlier socio-political developments, beginning with the 
collapse of the party-state hegemony. These tragic events are but a stage 
in the ongoing political and constitutional crisis that will, in all likelihood, 
continue for months and years. The 1993 summer opinion surveys show 
the public clamoring for law and order as a counterbalance to the 
mounting chaos and anarchy. To a society that never lived under a 
genuine constitution and frequently spurned the rule of law, the dictatorial 
means seemed a fair price to pay for instituting an order. When 
confronted with a choice between authoritarian rule by President Yeltsin 
and a military dictatorship by ex-communists, the first choice -- 
government by presidential dictate -- was given a clear preference. The 
populace still saw Yeltsin as the best hope for political and economic 
reforms. Yeltsin's decision to dissolve and later to storm Parliament should 
be seen against the backdrop of this popular support for strong actions 
designed to restore order without turning back the wheel of history. Our 
data show that in the beginning of October, the majority (52 percent) of 
the Russian population generally supported Yeltsin's decision to do away 
with the old Parliament, while 24 percent of the respondents opposed his 
action. Yeltsin's decision drew a particularly strong approval from college 
educated people (61 percent supported and 20 percent disapproved the 
action), whereas less educated respondents, those without a high school 
diploma, showed the least enthusiasm for the radical course of action (44 
percent approved and 28 percent disapproved Yeltsin's decision). Nobody 
anticipated that the confrontation between the President and the 
Parliament would take a bloody turn, and most likely nobody wanted the 
showdown to go that far, but the configuration of political forces and 
public opinion in the nation compelled the course of events. Public opinion 
in Russia took the side of the President and generally approved his use of 
force, in part because it followed the bloodbath provoked by the militant 
supporters of Parliament. According to the findings gathered in mid-
October of '93 by the National Center for Public Opinion Research, 20 
percent of the respondents stated that Yeltsin's recourse to force was 
timely and 35% believed that he waited too long to clamp down on his 
opponents. The majority of those polled declared that Yeltsin had the right 
to dissolve the Parliament. This judgment, which was not entirely 
consistent with the then current constitution, showed that the population 
was willing to disregard the legal niceties in the face of a severe political 
crisis. However, the mood in the country soon changed once again. 
Yeltsin's ratings slipped in November of 1993, which led to the defeat of 
his allies during the December 12 Parliamentary election. 
But subsequent events showed that Yeltsin might have been too hasty 
suspending the constitution. I am talking about the December '93 
Parliamentary elections. The disillusionment with the democratic process, 
the pervasive economic hardship, and the failure of reformers to 
coordinate their efforts translated into a surprising show of strength by 
the ultra-nationalists led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As our findings show, 
Zhirinovsky, the head of the mislabeled Liberal Democratic Party, drew his 
support chiefly from the lower middle class. Those who voted for him were 
people with a below-average education, employed in the sectors of the 
economy vulnerable to unemployment, concerned about the crime 
situation, and humiliated by Russia 's loss of a superpower status. While 
the traditional Soviet working class voted for radical nationalists, older and 
retired people were most prominent among the communist party 
supporters. Nearly a third of those who gave their voice to Zhirinovsky 
waited until election day to make up their mind. Few voters knew much 
about Zhirinovsky and his party, most chose this venue as a way to 
dramatize their displeasure with the reforms and the negative impact they 
had on their standards of living. The vote for Zhirinovsky was mainly a 
vote against the establishment. Some of his supporters already indicated 
that they regretted their vote, so he might be a temporary phenomenon 
on the Russian political scene. It is certainly too early to tell. What seems 
perfectly clear now is that dismantling the old Russian and Soviet political 
tradition and replacing it with a viable democratic civic culture will be a 
long and arduous process. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
(% to the total answers) 
 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
I have always participated and 
still participate in public life 
10 13 7 4 3 
Now I have a real opportunity for 
participation 
11 1 1 1 .5 
There is still no real opportunity 
for participation 
33 22 21 17 19 
Lately, I have lost interest in 
public  
life 
- 12 14 16 16 
I have no interest in politics 7 12 11 21 26 
The most important question 
today is the fate of our nation 
34 32 26 28 26 
 
Table 2 
(% to the total answers) 
 
1990 1991 1992 
Hope 13 20 17 
Confusion 23 27 24 
Dispair 28 27 18 
Confidence 6 6 5 
  
Table 3 
(% to the total answers) 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Mikhail Gorbachev 51 44 16 14 1 
Boris Yeltsin 5 19 44 38 17 
  
 
 
 
 
